United States v. Maine by Powell, Lewis F., Jr.
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons
Supreme Court Case Files Powell Papers
10-1985
United States v. Maine
Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Admiralty Commons
This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Powell Papers at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
U.S. v. Maine. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 122. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee
University School of Law, Virginia.
'~ 
~~ 7. 5~ ?u-.-_W. ~ n.-4 . 





September 30, 1985 Conference 
Summer List 25, Sheet 5 
No. 35 Original 
UNITED STATES 
v. 
Exceptions to Report of 
Special Master and Reply 
of the United States 
MAINE, et al. [Special Master - \'Jalter E. Hoffman] 
SUMMARY: The Special Master found that Vineyard Sound is ..__.. .., 
an historic bay and that its waters are therefore inland waters 
belonging to Massachusetts. The Special Master found that 
Nantucket Sound is not an historic bay. Massachusetts has filed ________..... '"::::::; 
exceptions to the Special Master's findings as to Nantucket 
Sound arguing that the Special Master improperly required that 
Massachusetts prove its title to Nantucket Sound by evidence 
that was "clear beyond doubt." The United States accepts the 
Special Master's conclusions and has filed a reply brief 
opposing Massachusetts' exceptions. 
S f'f tMf Fo(2. f+f2W~l: 
~LA 
C ~(LQ_ ~ ~ ~1> ?!J-~. Yo~ ~ wo.~t+o nul ~'t ~ ~ 
, 
BACKGROUND: In January 1977, the United States and 
Massachusetts filed a joint motion for supplemental proceedings 
to determine the coastline of Massachusetts. On June 29, 1977, 
the Court appointed Judge Walter E. Hoffman to serve as Special 
Master. 433 U.S. 917 (1977). Originally, the dispute concerned 
Buzzards Bay, Massachusetts Bay, Vineyard Sound and Nantucket 
Sound. In 1981, the parties agreed to a partial settlement. 
The United States accepted Massachusetts' position on Buzzards 
Bay and Massachusetts agreed to the position of the United 
States on Massachusetts Bay. The Court entered a supplemental 
decree accepting the settlement. 452 U.S. 429 (1981). 
The Special Master held hearings on the remaining issues in 
October and November of 1982 and in June and July of 1983. On 
May 24, 1985, the Special Master filed his Report with the 
Court. On June 17, 1985, the Court ordered the Special Master's 
Report filed and gave the parties 45 days in which to file 
exceptions. Massachusetts filed its exceptions on August 2, 
1985 and the United States tendered a reply brief on 
September 10, 1985. 
At issue is the treatment of Vineyard Sound and Nantucket 
Sound. Massachusetts claims that it has historic or ancient 
title to the Sounds and therefore they are inland waters belong 
to Massachusetts. The United States argues (a) that 
Massachusetts never had title to the Sounds and (b) that in any 
event, the United States has disclaimed title to the Sounds and 
therefore the Sounds cannot belong to Massachusetts. According 
to the United States, the Sounds are territorial waters, or if 
~ more than three miles from a coast, high seas. 
, 
MASTER'S REPORT: To facilitate this presentation, I have 
divided the Special Master's Report into five sections: (1) the 
legal setting for Hassachusetts' claim; (2) the United States' 
disclaimer of Massachusetts' title; (3) the doctrine of ancient 
title; (4) the evidence supporting Massachusetts' claims and (5) 
the Special Master's evaluation of Massachusetts' claim. 
1. The Legal Setting. The Master initially set 
Massachusetts' claim of historic title to Vineyard Sound and 
Nantucket Sound in the context of the present legal system. He 
explained that this Court has directed that the Convention on 
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 15 
U.S.T. 1607, T.I.A.S. 5639 [hereinafter the Convention] be used 
to define inland or internal waters.l The Master noted that 
Article 7 of the Convention sets forth rules of determining 
whether a body of water is a bay and is therefore inland water. 
Neither Sound meets the specific criteria for bays. However, 
Article 7(6) of the Convention provides that "historic bays" may 
be treated as bays even if they do not meet the other criteria 
listed in the Convention. 
Massachusetts claims both Sounds under the "historic bays" 
savings clause of Article 7(6). The Master cited the following 
passage from United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184-189 (1975), 
to explain the elements of a valid historic claim: 
The term "historic bay" is not defined in the 
Convention. The Court, however, has stated 
that in order to establish that a body of water 
lciting United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 17-35 
(1969) and United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 161-167 
(1965). See also United States v. Ma1ne, U.S. 53 
U.S.L.W. 4151, 4154 (1985) and United States-v. LouiSiana, 
U.S. 53 U.S.L.W. 4186, 4187 (1985). 
is a historic bay, a coastal nation must have 
"traditionally asserted and maintained dominion 
with the acquiescence of foreign nations." 
United States v. California, 381 U.S. at 172. 
Furthermore, the Court appears to have accepted 
the general view that at least three factors 
are significant in the determination of 
historic bay status: (1) the claiming nation 
must have exercised authority over the area; 
(2) that exercise must have been continuous; 
and (3) foreign states must have acquiesced in 
the exercise of the authority, Louisiana 
Boundary Case, 394 U.S. at 75 and 23-24, n. 27. 
The Master went on to find that an additional barrier to a state 
advancing a claim of historic title was the possibility that the 
United States "would disclaim that the disputed areas in fact 
are historic waters." Report at 12. 
2. The United States' Disclaimer. In this case, the 
United States disclaimed Massachusetts' title. The Special 
Master responded with two inquiries: (a) \lhether the United 
States had effectively disclaimed "any intention on its part to 
establish Vineyard Sound or Nantucket Sound as historic inland 
waters"; and (b) what "burden of proof rests on Hassachusetts to 
produce sufficient evidence to overcome the disclaimer." 
The Special Master concluded that the United States' 
attempt to disclaim historic title to the two Sounds "was 
ineffective for the purposes of this litigation." He based his 
finding on two factors. First, he noted that for two years, 
from 1977 until 1979, the Coast Guard issued regulations 
pursuant to the International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea, that applied inland water regulations to 
vessels moving in both Sounds. The regulations were changed in 
1979 only after the Justice Department became aware of the 
~ conflict between the regulations and the United States' position 
'. 
( 
in this litigation. Second, the Master noted that the United 
States conceded the validity of Massachusetts' historic title to 
Buzzards Bay, which title rested on the same kind of historic 
evidence as Massachusetts' claim to Vineyard Sound and Nantucket 
Sound. The Master concluded "[T]he willingness of the United 
States ultimately to concede an historic title which it had 
disclaimed strenuously for almost four years makes suspect the 
genuineness of its disclaimer to the Sounds." Report at 20. 
Despite his finding that the United States' disclaimer was 
ineffective, the Master went on to consider what standard of 
proof would be required in light of an effective disclaimer. 
His analysis started with the Court's statement in United States 
v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 175 (1965) that "[w]e are reluctant 
to hold that such a disclaimer would be decisive in all 
circumstances, for a case might arise in which the historic 
evidence was clear beyond doubt." The parties disagreed whether 
this quote and subsequent cases established a "clear beyond 
doubt" standard. The Special Master concluded: 
Were this a case of first impression, the Special 
Master would be inclined to agree with Massachusetts 
that the "clear beyond doubt" standard is an impossibly 
high burden to impose on a state putting forth a 
historic claim. However, the Supreme Court has had 
the opportunity to ease the states' burden when it 
considered the Special Masters' reports in the Florida 
and Louisiana cases. In both cases, the Supreme Court 
overruled the States' exceptions; by implication, 
therefore, the Court also affirmed the propriety of 
the "clear beyond doubt" standard. Report at 24.2 
3. The Doctrine of Ancient Title. The Master next 
turned to a discussion of ancient title. He explained that the 
LThe Special Master, however, noted that to avoid needless 
relitigation should the Supreme Court accept Massachusetts' 
position, his Report would also indicate his conclusions "as to 
the validity of the Massachusetts' claim under either standard." 
doctrine of ancient title "can apply only to the acquisition of 
territories which international law considers terra nullius, 
land currently having no sovereign but susceptible to 
sovereignty." Applied to waters normally considered high seas, 
a claim of ancient title requires that a state show that the 
occupation took place before the freedom of the high seas became 
part of international law. The claim is based "on occupation as 
an original mode of acquisition of territory," in other words, 
"clear original title which is fortified by long usage." Report 
at 25. 
The Master explains the difference between "historic" and 
"ancient" title as follows: 
Unlike a claim based on historic title, one 
based on ancient title is not prescriptive, i.e., it 
does not assert dominion over waters which belong 
equally to all countries. A state making an ancient 
title claim therefore need not prove all the elements 
necessary to establish historic title. Effective 
occupation, from a time prior to the victory of the 
doctrine of freedom of the seas, suffices to establish 
a valid claim to a body of water under ancient title. 
Report at 25-26. 
The Master found that the doctrine of ancient title is 
recognized as a general principle of international law [citing 
the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. 116] and 
therefore is properly applicable to this proceeding as an 
alternative to the doctrine of historic title. 
4. The Evidence Supporting Massachusetts' Claim. The 
bulk of the Special Master's Report is devoted to discussing the 
legal and factual support for Massachusetts' claim. The Master 
discussed the material in three parts: (a) Massachusetts as the 
successor in interest to the British Crown; (b) the history of 
activity in the Sounds; and (c) the 1881 legislation and 
Vineyard Sound. 
a. Massachusetts as the Successor in Interest to 
the British Crown. 
Massachusetts argued that it has ancient title to the two 
Sounds because: (1) the Crown had title by way of discovery and 
passed that title to Massachusetts through the Royal Charters of 
1664 and 1691; or alternatively, (2) if the Charters did not 
pass title, the Sounds were inland county waters under the inter 
fauces terrae doctrine of the English common law. The Master 
found that both theories required that Massachusetts show that: 
(a) "the two Sounds were indeed county waters under generally 
accepted English legal theories during the colonial period"; and 
(b) "assuming the general validity of an ancient title claim, 
the Sounds were inland waters at the time that Massachusetts 
acceded to the Union." Report at 31. 
The Naster concluded, based on English and American 
precedents, that the county waters doctrine was "viable both in 
English and American legal doctrine well into the nineteenth 
century." The Master also concluded that both Sounds were "the 
kinds of bodies of water which both English and American 
practice would have considered suitable for treatment as inland, 
county water." Report at 37 and 38. 
The Master next studied the language of the Charters, 
considered the practices of colonial times and reviewed this 
Court's opinion in Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842). He 
concluded that the Charters could have conveyed title to only 
such "arms of the sea" as would have been recognized as county 
waters or waters inter fauces terrae. Report at 43. 
This conclusion required a determination of the definition 
of "county waters" and the application of the definition to the 
two Sounds. The Master found that three theories defining 
county waters "had widespread acceptance and were used, either 
singly or in combination with one another." The first, and 
oldest, was the "line of sight between headlands" theory. Under 
this theory, "if an individual standing on one headland could 
see across to the other, then waters landward of an imaginary 
closing line connecting the headlands could be treated as 
inland." Report at 44. However, the authorities on this theory 
contained conflicting statements as to the requisite degree of 
visibility between headlands. This led to the development of 
two competing theories. Lord Coke stressed the range of visual 
knowledge, rather than the range of sight. Coke limited county 
waters to bays "where a man standing on one side of the land may 
see what is done on the other." A competing and more expansive 
theory was propounded by Lord Hale. Lord Hale wrote: 
that arm or branch of the sea, which lies within 
the fauces terrae, where a man may reasonably 
discern between shore and shore, is, or at least 
may be, within the body of a county; and there-
fore within the jurisdiction of the sheriff or 
coroner. 
M. Hale, De Jure Maris C.4, in S.A. Moore, History 
of the Foreshore and Seashore and Law Relating 
Thereto, 376 (1888). 
The Master found that the Hale test was dominant at the time of 
the Charters, but that the Coke test was dominant in the United 
States by the early nineteenth century. 
The Master noted that Vineyard Sound met both the Coke and 
the Hale tests. On largely uncontradicted evidence the Master 
found that: (1) a person was visible across Vineyard Sound's 
largest mouth (less than six nautical miles wide); (2) "one 
could see appreciably farther and more clearly in colonial times 
than today"; and (3) due to erosion, Vineyard Sound's southwest 
mouth is wider now than it was in colonial times. Report at 
48-49. 
Nantucket Sound, however, presented a more complex 
situation. Its mouth is approximately 9.2 nautical miles wide 
today. The Master noted that Massachusetts conceded that its 
claim to the sound could not be established under the Coke 
test. The United States argued that Massachusetts could not 
prevail even under the Hale test. The Special Master disagreed 
and concluded 11 that Nantucket Sound meets the line of sight test 
of Lord Hale and would be considered waters inter fauces terrae 
before the Revolution.'' However, the Master went on to state: 
Nevertheless, because of the ambiguity of the 
evidence concerning the size of the eastern entrance 
to the sound during the colonial period, the Special 
Master cannot conclude that Massachusetts has proven 
this part of its case under the 11 clear beyond doubt 11 
standard of proof. Massachusetts can therefore 
establish an ancient title to Nantucket Sound only if 
the Supreme Court holds that the "clear beyond doubt 11 
standard is inappropriate for this proceeding. 
Report at 51. 
This statement is critical as Massachusetts' bases its 
exceptions on it. 
b. The History of Activity in the Sounds. 
The Master then turned his attention to the history and 
historical geography of the Sounds. The Master found that (a) 
an historic claim could be established "by evidence of an 
effective and long-term exploitation of relatively small, 
shallow, and at least partially landlocked bodies of water" and 
(b) 11Massachusetts has introduced sufficient evidence to support 
a finding that the nature and extent of the colonists' 
exploitation of the marine resources of the Sounds was 
I 
equivalent to a formal assumption of sovereignty over them.'' 
Report at 58. 
c. The 1881 Legislation and Vineyard Sound. 
The Master also reviewed the impact of certain 
Massachusetts legislation passed in 1881. The legislation 
directed the preparation of charts delimiting the State's 
boundaries. The charts clearly showed Vineyard Sound as inland 
water. The Master concluded that this legislation "operated as 
an effective assertion of Massachusetts' sovereignty over 
Vineyard Sou~d and therefore created an independent basis for 
the present Massachusetts' claim to the Sound as historic inland 
waters." Report at 60. 
5. Evaluation of Massachusetts' Claims. The Special 
Master found that as to Vineyard Sound, Massachusetts 
-established its sovereignty under "the doctrine of ancient 
..-....... - _,.., 
ti~ based on the royal charters and the county waters 
doctrine (waters inter fauces terrae)" and also on historic 
title. Report at 61. --
The Special Master, however, found that Massachusetts had 
'------failed to adequately prove its sovereignty over Nantucket 
Sou~pecifically, the Speci Master found: 
Massachusetts has established to the Special 
Master's satisfaction the fact that either the 
United States or Massachusetts could have 
treated Nantucket Sound as internal waters under 
the legal principles applicable in the late 
eighteenth century. Massachusetts has presented 
considerable evidence to show that Nantucket 
Sound was the kind of body of wate r which 
seventeenth and eighteenth century English law 
could have treated as waters inter fauces terrae 
and therefore capable of passLng to Massachusetts, 
and has also shown convincingly that Nantucket 
Sound formed a unique economic and geographical 
f 
unit during the colonial era. Both of these 
) 
factors, however, could only have served to 
justify an exercise of jurisdiction. They are 
insufficient by themselves to prove the 
existence o an actual~tablish 
jurisdict~ Nantuc"Ket Souna. [t is 
there ore t e SpecLa as er s opinion that 
the Commonwealth has failed to establish that 
either the United States or Massachusetts 
ever ass-ercecr-:t~ over the sound 
until 'assachusetts L s elatively 
recen y. 
Reporc--aE 64. 
The Master, in finding that neither party had asserted 
jurisdiction over Nantucket Sound, paid special attention to two 
factors. The first factor was the description of the customs 
districts established by the First Congress. The district for 
Dukes County [Martha's Vineyard and the Elizabeth Islands] 
included "all waters and shores within the county." However, 
the district for Nantucket included only the Island of 
Nantucket. The second factor was the evidence that 
Massachusetts "failed to assert jurisdiction over the center of 
Nantucket Sound until relatively recently." The Naster noted 
that it was unlikely that post-colonial Massachusetts ever 
claimed the interior of Nantucket Sound because the 
Massachusetts courts adopted the more restrictive Coke test and 
that in the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
legislature adopted a strict test claiming as inland water only 
those arms of the sea with mouths of six miles or less. The 
Master pointed out that the official maps of Massachusetts 
issued during the nineteenth century "failed to claim the 
interior of Nantucket Sound for Massachusetts." Report at 65. 
The Master's Report concludes with a section rejecting the 
United States' claim that the Sounds cannot be inland waters 
( 
f 
because they are international straits and an addendum noting 
the Court's February 26, 1985 opinion in United States v. 
Louisiana, U.S. , 53 U.S.L.W. 4186. The Master found 
that the Court's opinion in United States v. Louisiana did not 
change any of the Master's findings in this case. The Special 
Master's Report concludes with the recommendation that each 
party bear its own costs and share the actual expenses of the 
Special Master. 
MASSACHUSETTS' EXCEPTION: Massachusetts' basic argument is 
that the Master found that Massachusetts had presented 
sufficient evidence of ancient title to Nantucket Sound, but was 
constrained from awarding the Sound to Massachusetts because he 
erroneously believed that Massachusetts had to present evidence 
that was "clear beyond doubt." 
Massachusetts' brief is presented in two parts. The first 
part outlines Massachusetts' analysis of the Special Master's 
Report. The second contains Massachusetts' legal arguments that 
it should not be required to establish its claim of ancient 
title by evidence which is "clear beyond doubt." 
1. Analysis of the Special Master's Report 
Massachusetts commences its review of the Special Master's 
Report by noting that it no longer claims historic title to 
Nantucket Sound and will only assert its claim under the 
doctrine of ancient title. Exception at 4. Massachusetts 
alleges that it established its title by showing that (a) the 
Crown acquired title to the Sound by virtue of its discovery and 
occupation in the colonial period, and (b) Massachusetts 
acquired its title from the Crown by virtue of its colonial 
f 
Charters (or, at the latest, by virtue of the Treaty of Paris in 
1783). Exception at 4. 
Massachusetts reads the Special Master's Report as holding 
that whatever title the Crown acquired by discovery and 
occupation passed to Massachusetts through the colonial 
charters. Exceptions at 4 citing Report at 43. To establish 
the Crown's title to Nantucket Sound, Massachusetts presented 
evidence that the Sound was inland waters under the doctrine of 
county waters and that in the colonial period, British colonists 
in fact occupied the Sound. The State points out that the 
Master found that Massachusetts had adduced "sufficient evidence 
to support a finding that the nature and extent of the 
colonists' exploitation of the marine resources of the Sounds 
was equivalent to a formal assumption of sovereignty over them." 
Report at 58. 
Massachusetts concludes that all that remained was "to 
establish that the Sound qualified in the colonial period as 
inland waters under the county waters doctrine." Exception at 
5. Massachusetts contends that the Special Master found that 
Nantucket Sound "would have been considered waters inter fauces 
terrae before the Revolution," but concluded that this finding 
was not established by evidence which was "clear beyond doubt" 
because of the lack of evidence as to the exact width of the 
mouth of the sound in colonial times. Exception at 6. 
2. Legal Arguments against the use of a "Clear Beyond 
Doubt" Standard of Review 
Massachusetts first reviews the "Juridical Regime of 
Historic Waters, Including Historic Bay" [1962] 2 Y.B. Int'l 
Comm'n 1, O.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/143 (1962) (hereafter the Juridical 
Regime) which the Court has considered authoritative,3 and 
concludes that "there is nothing in the Juridical Regime that 
even implies that a claimant state has to meet this exceptional 
clear beyond doubt standard of proof, and every indication 
therein is to the contrary." Exception at 11. Massachusetts 
also reviews the International Court of Justices' opinion in the 
Anglo-Norweigian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. Reports 116, 
which the Master discussed, and finds that the characterizations 
given to Norway's evidence of ancient title demonstrates that 
the ICJ did not have in mind an "exceptional" standard of 
proof. Exception at 12. Massachusetts concludes that the 
exceptional standard is not required by international law. 
Massachusetts next argues that even where there is a 
disclaimer, the imposition of an extraordinary standard of proof 
finds no support in policy or in the decisions of this Court. 
The State makes a distinction between "the argument that a 
disclaimer should be given conclusive or extraordinary weight 
for reasons of policy, and the argument that it should be given 
such weight because of its evidentiary significance to the 
issues at hand." Exception at 14. Massachusetts does not 
question the second argument. However, Massachusetts rejects 
the United States' suggestion that a disclaimer is entitled to 
weight simply because a disclaimer is an exercise of its foreign 
affairs power. Massachusetts argues that this is "an argument 
of opportunity" and that the Court has rejected the argument 
~Massachusetts cites the Mississippi Sound Case, 105 S.Ct. 
~ at 1080, United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. at 200 and the 
Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 at 23-26, nn. 27-30, 76 n. 103. 
·l' '·. 
, 
that a disclaimer is conclusive. The State also argues that 
under the Submerged Lands Act, Congress chose as a baseline for 
state interests, the seaward limit of a state's inland waters 
and left the task of delimiting inland waters to the Court 
(citing United States v. California, 381 U.S. at 164-165). 
Massachusetts distinguishes the Supreme Court cases that 
the Special Master relied upon in imposing a "clear beyond 
doubt" standard. Exception 16-18. Massachusetts recognizes 
that Masters in some cases have construed the Court's opinions 
to require States to prove historic water claims by evidence 
which is "clear beyond doubt," but argues that those specific 
rulings have never been confirmed by the Court. 
Finally, Massachusetts contends that if an extraordinary 
standard of proof applies, it only applies where there has been 
an effective disclaimer by the United States and, here, the 
alleged disclaimer is ineffective. The State bases this 
conclusion on arguments that (a) the disclaimer was not 
unequivocal, (b) its genuineness is suspect and (c) "like the 
alleged disclaimer the inland water status of Mississippi Sound) 
it was adopted during the pendency of litigation with 
Massachusetts." Exception at 8. 
Massachusetts concludes that it presented sufficient 
evidence that a person could see across the entrance of 
Nantucket Sound in colonial times so as to require a finding 
that Massachusetts has ancient title to the Sound and that, 
therefore, Nantucket Sound is inland water. 
THE UNITED STATES REPLY: Although the United States 





qualify as inland waters,4 its reply takes issue with a number 
of the Master's findings and conclusions. The United States 
argues that; (a) regardless of the standard for proof, 
Massachusetts did not acquire ancient title to Nantucket Sound 
in colonial times; and (b) any colonial title that might have 
existed was lost either upon Massachusetts entry into the United 
States or subsequently renounced by both Massachusetts and the 
United States. Finally, the United States argues that the 
"clear beyond doubt" standard for evidence, although not 
dispositive in this case, is the appropriate standard of proof 
where the United States has disclaimed a State's claim of 
historic title. 
1. No Inland Water Title to the Sound was Perfected in 
Colonial Times 
The United States advances three objections to any finding 
of ancient title in Nantucket Sound. First, the United States 
argues that assuming the doctrine of ancient title is still 
viable,S it requires effective occupation "from a time prior to 
the victory of the doctrine of freedom of the seas" and that 
except for the relatively brief period of 
excessive Stuart pretensions, never fully 
accepted by the world community, freedom 
of the seas has been the prevailing 
4The United States does not believe that the Master's 
conclusion as to Vineyard Sound was correct. However, as the 
only practical effect of the holding is to add a 1,000 acre 
wedge to Massachusetts submerged lands, the United States 
concluded that it "ought not burden the Court with this issue." 
Rep 1 y at 1 n . 1. 
SThe United States suggests that a State may not today base 
its claim on maritime titles that were last asserted in the 17th 
and 18th centuries. Reply 6-8, n. 5. 
international law regime since several 
centuries before the alleged appropriation 
of Nantucket Sound, especially where British 
views held sway. 
Reply at 7. 
The United States second argument is that, even accepting 
the more generous Hale line-of-sight test, Nantucket Sound does 
not physically qualify for treatment as inland water. The 
United States contends that the doctrine of county waters only 
applies to "a bay or estuary or gulf whose waters lie sheltered 
'between the jaws of the land' culminating in mainland 
headlands." Reply at 9. Nantucket Sound is defined, except at 
the north, entirely· by islands, and therefore cannot be 
considered an "arm or branch of the sea, which lies within the 
fauces terrae" (or jaws of the land). 
The United States third point is that the Master erred to 
the extent that he found that there was "effective occupation" 
of Nantucket Sound. The United States describes Massachusetts' 
evidence as 
simply that the local inhabitants of the 
area in colonial times took full advantage 
of the natural resources offered by Nantucket 
Sound - as would any coastal people, whether 
the adjacent waters were "inland" or not. 
Reply at 10. 
2 . No Colonial Title Survives 
The United States suggests that regardless of the Master's 
finding of ancient title in colonial times, the Master was 
clearly correct 
in finding that neither the United States nor Massachusetts ever 
asserted jurisdiction over the Sound until recently. The United 
States argues that (a) no colonial title survived independence 
or the formation of the union, (b) any title that survived 
statehood was later voluntarily renounced or abandoned by 
' ' 
Massachusetts, and (c) any colonial title that survived 
statehood was effectively repudiated by the United States. 
The Unted States notes that there is no inhibition to a new 
sovereign renouncing a portion of the maritime territory enjoyed 
by a preceding sovereign and that the United States has 
repudiated "the sweeping claims once asserted in the ocean by 
Spain, Mexico and Great Britain."6 Although one ought not 
presume retrenchment, the United States argues that there are 
very strong indications against the claim of ancient title in 
this case. It argues that: (a) Justice Story as early as 1829 
endorsed the Coke test - which Massachusetts concedes will not 
embrace Nantucket Sound and inland waters, (2) in Commonwealth 
v. Peters, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 387 (1847), the Massachusetts 
courts adopted a standard for inland waters that Nantucket Sound 
could not satisfy, and (3) in 1859, the Massachusetts enacted 
legislation limiting inland water to "arms of the sea" with 
mouths of six miles or less. The United States also contends 
that now 
[i]t is now well settled that whatever right 
a State may have enjoyed in the marginal sea 
and beyond as an independent nation were 
surrendered to the United States upon acceding 
to the Union. United States v. Maine, 420 
U.S. 515, 522-523 (1975); United States v. 
Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 717-718 (1950). 
Reply at 12-13. 
The United States concludes that the law and the facts support 
the Master's finding that the United States, in fact, never 
claimed Nantucket Sound as inland water. 
6Reply at 11, citing United States v. California, 332 U.S. 
19, 32 (1947). See also United States v. Lou~s~ana, 363 U.S. 1, 
30, 71 (1960); Special Master's Report of October 14, 1952, in 
No.6, Orig., O.T. 1954, United States v. California, at 37-38, 
approved, 381 U.S. 139, 172-175, 177 (1965 . 
f 
The United States's argument that Massachusetts abandoned 
its claim to Nantucket Sounds is based on the same evidence: 
Justice Story's opinion, Commonwealth v. Peters, supra, and the 
1859 legislative acts. The SG also alleges that Massachusetts 
did not advance any claim to the Sound until 1971. The United 
States fortifies its factual presentation by arguing that "a 
loss of sovereignty and property rights can result from 
abandonment." The United States argues that although ancient 
title is originally lawful appropriation and not a ·usurpation, 
ancient title is relied upon only when the 
claim is inconsistent with modern legal 
standards; it is, in effect, a non-
conforming use, entitled to be "grand-
fathered" only because it was established 
before the current "zoning" rules v1ere 
enacted. Accordingly, an ancient title 
that offends prevailing international law 
criteria is susceptible to loss by non-use. 
Reply at 16. 
Whatever claim to Nantucket Sound survived Massachusetts' 
statehood, was lost through Massachusetts' failure to attempt to 
exercise sovereign rights before 1971. 11 7 
The United States also argues that its repudiation of 
Massachusetts' claim to Nantucket Sound does not "work an 
impermissible 'contraction of a State's recognized territory' in 
violation of the constitutional principle embodied in Pollard v. 
Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845) ." Reply at 20-21. The United 
States argues that a State's title to tideland and offshore 
lands, once vested, is not indefeasible and that changes in 
geography, whether natural or artificially caused, can deprive a 
7Tfie United States suggests that the Master erred in 
apparently assuming "that this position was reserved for straits 
with a significant amount of international traffic." Reply at 
18, n. 14. 
.. 
f 
State to title of the beds and shores of tidal waters.8 The 
United States' conclusion appears to be that changes in legal 
definitions concerning coastlines may also properly cause a 
State's boundaries to expand or contract and that, in this 
context, the federal Government's disclaimer is entitled to 
consideration. 
3. In Li ht of the Federal Disclaimers Massachusetts Must 
Establish its Colonial Title and the Title's Survival by 
Evidence "Clear Beyond Doubt" 
The United States explains that it does not believe that 
the Court need address the standard of proof issue. However, 
the United States argues that when, as here, the United States 
disclaims an area as inland water, the State must prove its 
title by evidence "clear beyond doubt." The SG finds support 
for the standard in the Court's recognition of foreign policy 
concerns and the unique nature of historic inland waters. A 
claim of historic inland waters is by definition a claim that is 
contrary to current international norms and therefore the claim 
must be "open and notorious." International law usually looks 
to the United States to define, at least initially, its own 
boundaries. Thus, in the face of a federal disclaimer, the 
State's evidence should be so strong as to justify a foreign 
nation's failure to follow the federal Government's position. 
Only title that is "clear beyond doubt" justifies the 
~Reply at 21, citing Ore~on ex rel. State Land Board v. 
Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.,29 U.S. 363, 372-378 (1977), 
United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965), Hughes v. 
Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967), California ex rel. State Lands 
Commission v. United States, 457 U.S. 273 (1982) and the 
Submerged Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1301). 
( 
embarrassment inherent in the rejection of the federal 
Government's public stance. 
DISCUSSION: The case should be set for oral argument 
because (a) the Special Master's Report does not clearly state 
the MaSter's basis for holding that Nantucket Sound is not 
inland water, and (b) Massachusetts and the United States -------disagree as to the basis of the Special Master's conclusion. 
Massachusetts focuses on the Special Master's statement 
that Massachusetts can establish ancient title to Nantucket 
Sound "only if the Supreme Court holds that the 'clear beyond 
~ 
doubt' standard i's inappropriate." Report at 51. Massachusetts 
makes a strong factual argument that this is an unreasonably 
high standard, at least where, as here, the Special Master found _______....__ 
that "although the United States attempted to disclaim historic 
title to the two Sounds, this disclaimer was ineffective for the 
purposes of this litigation." Report at 19. 
The United States, on the other hand, focuses on the 
Special Master's statement that Massachusetts "has failed to 
establish that either the United States or Massachusetts ever 
asserted jurisdiction over the Sound until Massachusetts did so 
relatively recently."9 Report at 64. The United States argues 
that this finding is dispositive because it means that even if 
Massachusetts once had ancient title to Nantucket Sound, it lost 
9This finding is a little confusing in light of the Special 
Master's earlier finding that the United States' attempted 
disclaimer was ineffective. How can the United States disdain a 
claim that has not been asserted? 
that title by failing to assert it.lO The United States makes a 
strong argument that a claim of ancient title, like a claim of 
historic title, may be lost if it is not openly and notoriously 
asserted. However, neither the Special Master nor Massachusetts 
directly address this issue. 
Since the Court must consider whether a claim of ancient 
title is lost if not openly asserted, it may wish to also 
address the United States' other objections to the Master's 
treatment of the doctrine of ancient title. Three of the United 
States' arguments are that (1) the doctrine of ancient title was 
discredited before ·England colonized Massachusetts, (2) the 
doctrine of ancient title is not applicable to Nantucket Sound 
because the Sound is formed by islands and not by the jaws of 
the mainland, and (3) Massachusetts' evidence of the colonial 
use of the natural resources of the Sound does not by itself, 
regardless of its quantum, establish "effective occupation." 
None of the United States' arguments are addressed by 
Massachusetts and while the Master's finding appear to be 
adverse to the United States' position, his reasoning, where 
expressed, is not clearly persuasive. 
In light of the ambiguity of the Master's reasoning, the 
parties' disagreement over what the Master actually held and 
Massachusetts' failure to anticipate or reply to the United 
States' arguments,ll the Court has little choice but to set the 
lOr£ the United States is correct, there is no standard of 
proof issue. There was no evidence before the Master of any 
assertion of jurisdiction by Massachusetts or the United States 
before 1971. There was evidence of disclaimers. Thus, under 
any standard of proof, Massachusetts would not prevail. 
liThe United States' reply brief was filed on September 10, 
19D5, and Massachusetts has not filed a response. However, it 
is not clear that Massachusetts is entitled to file a response 
to a reply brief. The Court might consider requesting further 
- Lj -
case for oral argument. Argument should help the Court 
determine which issues are dispositive and need to be decided. 
Depending on which issues prove to be persuasive, the Court may 
(1) adopt the Master's conclusions, (2) accept Massachusetts' 
exceptions or (3) refer the case back to a Master for further 
proceedings. 
CONCLUSION: Neither party has filed exceptions to the 
Master's conclusion that Vi~nd is inland water and that 
conclusion appears to be correct.l2 However, Massachusetts 
takes exception to the Master's conclusion that Nantucket Sound 
is not inland water and the parties reasonably disagree as to 
how the Master reached his conclusion. Under these 
circumstances, the Court should set the case for oral argument. 
The United States has filed a reply to Massachusetts' 
exceptions. 
9/25/85 Schickele 
12Massachusetts submitted considerably more evidence on 
Vineyard Sound than on Nantucket Sound. The Master found that 
Massachusetts had demonstrated that it had both ancient title 
and historic title to Vineyard Sound. A review of 
Massachusetts' evidence in light of the Court's discussion of 
historic title in United States v. Louisiana, U.S. , 53 
U.S.L.W. 4186 (February 26, 1985) suggests tha~assachusetts 
has historic title to Vineyard Sound even if it does not have 
ancient title to the Sound. 
10: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Bill 
DATE: September 27, 1985 
ffi: United States v. Maine, et al., No. 35 Original 
Exceptions to Special Master's Report 
""fu._ 
lftr'I-3 sole remaining issue in this case is whether -----N:mtucket Sound is an "historic bay," and is therefore -----
"inland water" under the Submerged Lands Act of 1953. If -----Nantucket Sound is an historic bay, then Massachusetts has 
title to it. If not, the Sound either belongs to the u.s. 
or is part of the high seas. The Special Master 
determined that the Sound is not "inland water." -Massachusetts claims that the Sound is an historic 
bay because the state has "ancient title" to it. The 
thited States counters that it has formally disclaimed the 
" 
Sound's inland water status, and that Massachusetts must 
fuerefore establish its ancient title by evidence which is 
"clear beyond doubt." In addition, the United States 
~gues that Massachusetts' title lapsed, because the state 
~. 
failed to assert jurisdiction over the Sound for a long 
t::er iod of time. 
'Ihe parties disagree as to just what the Special 
~
Master found, but it appears that the Special Master 
retermined that (1) Massachusetts' ancient title claim is 
-----~ 
supported by the evidence, 
---------------- ~ 
but is not 
~
"clear beyorrl -cbubt"; (2) the United States' disclaimer was ineffective; ----and (3) Massachusetts failed to assert jurisdiction over 
fue Sound for a long period of time, ending only recently. 
If I correctly understand the underlying law, t?_: third~ 
finding makes the first two irrelevant. Massachusetts' 
exceptions thus miss the point, because they focus on 
mether the state must prove its title under the "clear 
beyond doubt" standard. In short, it appears to me that 
fue Master's conclusion was probably correct. 
The memo writer recommends that the case be set for 
~gument to clarify the parties' positions. I tentatively 
agree, although I'm not sure how much the Court will 
~nefit from oral argument in this case. If my initial / 
view on the merits proves to be correct, the case should 
perhaps be disposed of in a brief per curiam affirming the 
Master's findings. 
l..,___----
--.L- --···-- .... -- , ....._ __ _ 
Court ................... . ·voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 35 Or ig. 
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UNITED STATES 
v. 
MAINE, et al. 
Motion of Massachusetts 
for Leave to File Reply 
Brief 
SUMMARY: On June 17, 1985, the Court ordered that the 
Special Master's Report be filed and allowed exceptions to be 
filed. On August 2, 1985, Massachusetts filed its exceptions to 
the Special Master's Report. On September 10, 1985, the United 
States filed its reply brief which supports the Master's 
recommendation but objects to his reasoning.l Massachusetts 
requests leave to file a reply to the United States' objections 
to the Special Master's findings and conclusions. 
lsee the Legal Office's memorandum on the exceptions to the 
Master's Report prepared for the September 30, 1985 Conference. 
On October 7, 1985, the Court ordered the exceptions set for 
oral argument. 
(012-AJJ,.- lu.vt.- .Jo fl... '""f1 fn;~ -
~·ll 
f 
CONTENTIONS: In support of its motion for leave to file a 
reply brief on or before October 25, 1985, Massachusetts 
advances three arguments: (1) the United States' reply brief 
exceeds the proper scope of a reply brief; (2) the United 
States' reasons for the scope of its reply brief are unsound; 
and (3) in any event, fairness requires that Massachusetts be 
permitted to respond to the reply brief filed by the United 
States. 
Massachusetts argues that because the United States filed 
no exceptions to the Special Master's Report, it may not in its 
reply brief, "mount a broad-based attack on the Special Master's 
findings and conclusions." Massachusetts alleges that the 
United States in its reply brief makes arguments that were never 
briefed to the Special Master and relies on "alleged evidence 
which was either never introduced, or never referred to in the 
arguments to the Special Master." Massachusetts then lists 
eight arguments advanced by the United States which 
Massachusetts claims were rejected, explicitly or implicitly, by 
the Special Master or not raised before the Special Master. 
Massachusetts' second argument is that the Court's June 17, 
1985 order "cannot reasonably be read to authorize the parties 
to reserve arguments against the Special Master's findings and 
rulings until the reply brief." Massachusetts notes by example 
that in United States v. Florida, 420 U.S. 531, 533 (1975), "the 
Court declined to decide arguments raised by the United States 
for the first time in exceptions, and instead referred them back 
to the Special Master." Hassachusetts concludes that although 
(. . 
the procedures for original cases are not prescribed by statutes 
or rules, this does not excuse the United States from complying 
with the Court's June 17, 1985 order. 
Massachusetts' final argument is that fairness requires 
that it be given an opportunity to respond to the United States' 
reply brief. Because the reply brief exceeds the usual scope of 
a reply brief and raises issues allegedly not presented to the 
Special Master, Massachusetts could not anticipate the arguments 
advanced by the United States. Massachusetts suggests that its 
oral arguments will be ''ineffectual" if it cannot, before 
argument, refer the Court to those portions of the record that 
rebut the points raised by the United States. 
The SG has submitted a response to the motion defending the 
United States' reply brief, but agreeing that Massachusetts 
should be allowed to file a reply brief. 
DISCUSSION: The motion for leave to file a reply brief 
should be granted. The United States' reply brief does raise 
several issues that are not explicitly addressed by the Special 
Master and are not directly responsive to Massachusetts' 
exceptions. Massachusetts could not have anticipated that the 
United States would raise these issues. A reply brief by 
Massachusetts should help the Court both in determining which of 
the United States' issues should be considered and in resolving 
these issues. 
A reference of an original case to a Special Master is 
analogous to a DC's reference of a case to a magistrate. Like 
the DC, the Court is responsible for the findings and 
conclusions which are entered. Therefore, the Court may 
' 
consider challenges to a Special Master's Report, even though 
they are untimely or were not raised before the Master. For 
example, in United States v. Florida, supra, the United States 
raised in its exceptions to the Special Master's Report, 
contentions which it had not presented to the Master. The Court 
did not ignore the late contentions, instead it referred them to 
the Master for consideration. Massachusetts' reply brief will 
refer the Court to evidence and portions of the Master's Report 
which, in Massachusetts' opinion, refute the arguments advanced 
by the United States. This should help the Court determine 
whether the issues are ripe for disposition or require further 
development. 
Granting the motion will not inconvenience the Court. 
Although the Court has ordered the exceptions set for oral 
argument, there is no urgency in the case (the original 
reference to the Master was made in 1977). Argument can be put 
off until after the reply brief has been received. 
CONCLUSIONS: The motion by Massachusetts for leave to file 
a reply brief should be granted. The United States filed a 
reply brief of unusual scope containing several arguments that ---------could not have been anticipated. A response to those arguments 
should be helpful to the Court in its review of the Special 
Master's Report. 
There is a response. 
10/8/85 Schickele 
.... •,. "· . ~ 
uctooer 11, 1985 
Court ................... . l-•oted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned . ................. , 19 . . . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced . . . . . ........... , 19 .. . 
UNI TED STATES 
vs. 
MAINE 
Motion of Mass. fo r leave to f i le reply brief. 
HOLD 
FOR 
Burger, Ch. J . ... ........... . . 
Brennan, J ................... . 
White, J .. .. .. . . ............ . . 
Marshall, J ..... . ........... . . 
Blackmun, J ................. . 
Powell, J . . .................. . 
Rehnquist, J ................. . 
CERT . 
G D 
Stevens, J ................. . ......... . 
O'Connor, J .......................... . 
J URISDICTIONAL 
STATE M EN'J' 





N 35 Orig. J. 0 . 
AD SENT NOT VO'riNG 
CCC 12/03/85 
BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell December 3, 1985 
From: Cabell 
No. 35, Original, u.s. v. Maine(~U~ 
Exception to Report of Special Master Walter E. Hoffman 
Wednesday, December 11, 1985 (1st case) 
Questions Presented 
~ 
1. Does Massachusetts possess title to Nantucket Sound 
if the burden of proof is merely to "persuade[] the finder of its 
claim"? Mass.Br. 7. 
2. Did the Special Master err in applying a "clear be-
tween a State and the United States? 
I. BACKGROUND 
This case arises from the United States' action to quiet 
title commenced in 1968. seeks possession 
\A 
under the theory that it l],ad ancient title even if it did not 
n - "c 
have historical title. 
There is an important contrast between "ancient title" 
and "historic title" {the traditional basis upon which States 
have relied in claiming sovereignty over disputed waters). 
~ ( 
An-
cient title~requires that the claimant show that it occupied~he 
waters in question and "'that the occupation took place before 
the freedom of the high seas became part of international law." 
Because ancient title does not involve the assertion of sover-
eignty over waters that otherwise would belong equally to all 
countries, a state claiming ancient title "therefore need not 
prove all the elements necessary to prove historic title. Effec-
tive occupation, from a time prior to the victory of the doctrine 
of freedom of the seas, suffices to establish a valid claim to a 
body of water under ancient title." Report 25-26. 
In establishing ancient title through a series of legal 
tests that are irrelevant here, Massachusetts had introduced evi-
dence that someone standing on the Great Point could have seen 
the southern shore of Cape Cod at points where the Sound is wider 
than it is at the eastern mouth. The E~al Mast~ concluded 
that: 
~Nantucket Sound meets the line of sight test of Lord 
Hale and would have been considered waters inter fauces 
terrae before the Revolution. Nevertheless, because of 
the ambi~idence concerning the size of 
the eastern entrance to the sound during the colonial 
period, the Special Master cannot conclude that Massa-
chusetts has proved this part of its case under the 
'clear beyond doubt' standard of proof. Massachusetts 
can therefore establish an ancient title to Nantucket I .J'~"~_h.__.."i 
Sound OJ}_l,y if the Supreme Court holds that the 'clear 5 f-IIY.--..__- .,..,) 
beyond doubt' standard is inappropriate for this pro-
ceeding." S.M.Rpt. 51. 
The United States advances a number of alternative 
grounds to support the Special Master's finding that Massachu-
setts failed to establish continuing ancient title over Nantucket 
Sound. It begins by noting that: 
"Had we the courage of our convictions, we would rest 
with a mere reference to pages 64 and 65 of the Report 
in which the Special Master unequivocably [sic], and 
unanswerably' disposes of f:he commonwea!Eh Is -claim to 
Na~ ~ound By demonstratin that an e~lier title 
to · a a ng s apse • e a ter 's 
conclusion there 1s un and plainly does not 
depend on the standard required of Massachu-
setts--the only matter its present brief is 
addressed." u.s.Br. 2. 
Even if Massachusetts did prove that it once had ancient title to 
the Sound, and that is all the Special Master's alternative find-
ing concluded, Report 51, the critical issue is whether that an-
cient title survived. 
II. DISCUSSION 
Although it appears that the United States is correct in 
arguing that Massachusetts must meet a heightened evidentiary 
burden, that question is irrelevant. Massachusetts has failed to 
the other half of the ancient title test: showing that 
sovereignty has been exercised continuously. -------
'' 
A. Ancient Title 
Massachusetts has conceded that it failed to demonstrate 
~ .... 
a sufficient continuing exercise of sovereignty over Nantucket 
~ ---- ----- -:-
Sound to justify a finding of historic title , but contends that 
it has a 
that Massachusett's claim to historic title had lapsed during the 
nineteenth century because Massachusetts adopted a restricted 
definition of its coastal waters that could not be met with re-
spect to Nantucket Sound under any standard of proof. Assuming 
for a moment that Massachusetts could establish that it once had 
ancient title -- I deal with the burden of proof question below -
- the Special Master's findings concerning the lapse of historic 
title mean that any claim to ancient title would similarly have 
lapsed. 
Massachusetts argues that the quantity of evidence re-
quired to show retention of sovereignty is significantly less 
than the quantity of evidence required to show establishment of 
sovereignty. "While it is theoretically possible in internation-
al law for a sovereign title to territory to be 'abandoned,' ac-
tual instances therefore are exceedingly rare." Reply Br .Mass. 
23. In other cases, gaps of over two centuries did not consti-
tute abandonment. Ibid. 
But it appears that the cases and commentators dealing ( 
do not distinguis~ ~!!! b~~ EI?" ~d 
and a lapse in the latter would also mean a 
lapse in the former. Moreover, they seem to assume that some 
continuing evidence of sovereignty is necessary. See, ~g., Case 
,,. 
of the Minquiers and Ecrehos, 1953 I.C.J. 47, 53 (describing 
French and English claims that each possessed 11 an ancient or 
original title and that their title has always been main-
tained and never lost 11 ); Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, 1951 
I.C.J. 116, 133 (finding relevant .. certain economic interests •.. 
the reality and importance of which are clearly evidenced by a 
long usage 11 ); Juridical Regime 34, ,I 71 (ancient title based on 
"a clear original title which is fortified by long usage") ; Y. 
Blum, Historic Titles in International Law 250 (ancient title 
"can be recognized to-day only if the claimant state is in a po-
sition to prove that it asserted its authority over the allegedly 
historic waters since the emergence of the relevant rules of the 
modern international law of the sea")~ 
Massachusetts would have to show that its claim was 
maintained after the acceptance of the doctrine of the doctrine 
of the freedom of the high seas. Although the Special Master did 
not address this element in his discussion of ancient title, he 
did in his discussion of historic title. He found that, far from 
continuing to exercise sovereignty over the center of Nantucket 
Sound, " [ i 1 t is unlikely that post-colonial Massachusetts ever 
claimed the interior of Nantucket Sound." Report 65. It effec-
tively disclaimed sovereignty, both judicially, through its adop-
tion of a boundary test that cannot be met by Nantucket Sound 
(the Coke test), and administratively, through the publication of 
official maps that failed to claim the interior of the Sound. 
The Special Master's finding that 11 Whatever rights [Massachu-
setts] may have had over Nantucket Sound during the colonial pe-
riod lapsed until the Commonwealth's recent attempt to resusci-
tate them," ibid, must logically include its ancient rights 
since, because the colonial period antedated freedom of the high 
seas, the rights Massachusetts may have had were necessarily an-
cient rights. 
Massachusetts essentially argues that the findings with 
respect to the lapse of historic title are insufficient to sup-
port a finding that the ancient title has also lapsed. But (1) 
Its reliance on the "leading case" involving the Channel Islands, 
Case of the Minquiers and Ecrahos, 1953 I.C.J. 47, is misplaced 
because the Court did not find a total gap in the exercise of 
jurisdiction in excess of two centuries to be irrelevant to the 
assertion of sovereignty: ( 2) There is no reason a lesser stand-
ard of proof should apply to ancient titles, and because the fre-
quently extravagent ancient titles carve out an exception to the 
presumption of freedom of the high seas that is even greater than 
that of historic titles, the standard possibly should be higher: 
and (3) The Special Master's discussion of the lapse of historic 
title shows that the issue of continuing jurisdiction was not 
even close. 
/ 
B. The Burden of Proof 
If the Court reaches this question, I am persuaded by 
the United States' argument that the nature of the federal system 
counsels placing a heavy burden on are con-
tested by the United States. Some elaboration on that standard ___ _,
-:;-- ---
may be necessary. The contrast in United States v. California, 
'I• 
381 u.s., at 175, and the Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 u.s., at 
77, between evidence that is "clear beyond doubt" and "question-
able evidence" suggests that "clear beyond doubt" is merely the 
Court's way of describing the kind of evidence likely to overcome 
an effective disclaimer. Thus the apparent amalgam of two dif-
ferent conventional evidentiary standards -- "clear and convinc-
ing" and "beyond reasonable doubt" -- suggests that the Court 
was not trying to expound a new evidentiary standard, but was 
instead trying to convey the heightened showing required by 
States whose territorial claims are contested by the Federal Gov-
ernment. Moreover, I believe that the heightened standard should 
apply to State claims whether or not the United States explicitly 
disclaimed the State's position prior to litigation, and there-
fore agree with the Special Master's seeming paradoxical applica-
tion of a heightened standard of proof after he found no effec-
tive disclaimer. 
III. CONCLUSION 
I recommend overruling Massachusetts' exception to the 
Special Masters Report without reaching the question of burden of 
proof. 
December 3, 1985 Cabell Bench Mem. 
..: .... ' .. 
Argued 12/11/85 
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From: Justice Stevens 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 35, Orig. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF v. 
STATES OF MAINE, NEW HAMPSHIRE, MASSACHU-
SETTS, RHODE ISLAND, NEW YORK, NEW JERSEY, 
DELAWARE, MARYLAND, VIRGINIA, NORTH CARO-
LINA, SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA AND FLORIDA 
ON BILL OF COMPLAINT 
[January-, 1986] 
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question now before the Court is whether Nantucket 
Sound qualifies as "internal waters" of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts rather than partly territorial sea and partly 
high seas as the United States contends. We agree with the 
Special Master's conclusion that the Commonwealth's claim 
should be rejected. 
I 
Pursuant to an earlier decree of this Court, 1 the United 
States and Massachusetts in 1977 filed a Joint Motion for 
Supplemental Proceedings to determine the location of the 
Massachusetts coastline. After our appointment of a Special 
Master, 433 U. S. 917 (1977), the parties agreed on a partial 
settlement, which we approved in 1981. 452 U. S. 429. 
' In 1968 the United States invoked our original jurisdiction to quiet title 
to the seabed along the coast of the Atlantic Ocean. In 1975 we entered a 
decree affirming the title of the United States to the seabed more than 
three geographic miles seaward of the coastline, and of the States to the 
seabed within the three geographic mile zone. United States v. Maine, 
423 U. S. 1 (1975). See also United States v. Maine, 420 U. S. 515 (1975). 
In that decree we reserved jurisdiction which either the "United States or 
any defendant State [could] invoke . .. by filing a motion in this Court for 
supplemental proceedings." 423 U. S., at 2. 
t.1.~ 
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Left unresolved was the status of Vineyard Sound and Nan-
tucket Sound, a dispute which gave rise to extensive hear-
ings before the Special Master. The Master concluded that 
Vineyard Sound is a "historic bay" and therefore a part of the 
inland waters of Massachusetts. However, he reached a 
contrary conclusion concerning Nantucket Sound. Explain-
ing that the decision concerning Vineyard Sound has only 
minimal practical significance/ the United States has taken 
no exception to the Master's report. Massachusetts, how-
ever, has excepted to that part of the report concerning Nan-
tucket Sound. Specifically, although Massachusetts acqui-
esces in the determination that the doctrine of "historic title" 
does not support its claim, it continues to maintain that it has 
"ancient title" to Nantucket Sound. 
Nantucket Sound is a relatively shallow body of water 
south of Cape Cod, northeast of the island of Martha's Vine-
yard, and northwest of the island of Nantucket. Massachu-
setts contends that the English Crown acquired title to this 
territory as a result of discovery and occupation by colonists 
in the early 17th Century and that it succeeded to the 
Crown's title by virtue of various Royal Charters or by the 
Treaty of Paris, which ended the Revolutionary War. 3 
2 According to the Solicitor General, all but 1,000 acres of the sub-
merged lands of Vineyard Sound belong to the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts as underlying territorial waters, even under its view that those 
waters are not inland. 
3 In particular, the Commonwealth points to the charter granted in 1664 
by King Charles II to the Duke of York conveying title to New York, New 
Jersey, and most of New England, cf. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 
413-414 (1842); Mahler v. Norwich & N . Y. Transp. Co., 35 N. Y. 352, 355 
(1866), and to the charter granted in 1691 by the English monarchs William 
and Mary to the colonists of Massachusetts consolidating into "one real! 
Province by the Name of Our Province of the Massachusetts Bay in New 
England" the territories and colonies that were then commonly known as 
Massachusetts Bay, New Plymouth, ''the Province of Main" and the terri-
tory called Accadia or Nova Scotia, see Mass. Ex. 45, p. 8. Alternatively, 
Massachusetts asserts that it acquired sovereignty over the area by virtue 
of the Treaty of Paris signed in 1793. Cf. Manchester v. Massachusetts, 
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To prove that Great Britain acquired .title to Nantucket 
Sound which it could pass to Massachusetts, much of the evi-
dence presented to the Special Master concerned whether 
Nantucket Sound would have been considered "county wa-
ters" under English law in the 17th century. Under the 
"county waters" doctrine, waters "inter fauces terrae" or 
landward of an opening "between the jaws of the land" could 
be subject to the jurisdiction of the littoral county rather than 
the Admiral if the jaws were close enough to each other to 
satisfy a somewhat ambiguous line-of-sight test. Under 
Lord Coke's version of the test a person standing on one jaw 
must be able to "see what is done" on the other jaw; 4 under 
Lord Hale's more expansive version, it is merely necessary 
that "a man may reasonably discern between shore and 
shore." 5 
The relevant jaws of land in this case are the southern tip 
of Monomoy Island, which extends south from the elbow of 
Cape Cod, and the northern tip of Nantucket Island. At the 
present time, those two jaws are 9.2 nautical miles apart, but 
the distance may have been greater in colonial times. In any 
event, the parties agree that the distance was too great to 
satisfy Lord Coke's version of the test. Whether it would 
meet Lord Hale's test depends, in the opinion of the Master, 
on whether the Commonwealth's burden of proof is merely to 
persuade by a preponderance of the evidence or by evidence 
139 U. S. 240, 256-257 (1891); Mahler v. Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co., 35 
N. Y., at 356. 
'Coke, Fourth Institute, cap. 22, 140 (describing as inland waters those 
anns of the sea "where a man standing on one side of the land may see 
what is done on the other."). 
5 M. Hale, De Jure Maris et Branchiorum ejusdem cap. iv (1667), re-
printed in R. Hall, Essay on the Rights of the Crown and the Privileges of 
the Subject in the Sea Shores of the Realm App. vii (2d ed. 1875) ("That 
ann or branch of the sea, which lies within the fauces terrae, where a man 
may reasonably discerne between shore and shore, is, or at least may be 
within the body of a county, and therefore within the jurisdiction of the 
sheriff or coroner." (citation omitted)). 
.. 
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that is "clear beyond doubt." For purposes of our decision, 
we put to one side the parties' argument about the burden 
and assume that Lord Hale's test is satisfied. 6 On the as-
sumption that Nantucket Sound could have been considered 
"county waters" under the common law of England in the 
17th century, we nevertheless conclude that Massachusetts 
cannot prevail under the doctrine of "ancient title" on which 
it relies. 
II 
This Court has consistently followed principles of interna-
tional law in fixing the coastline of the United States. 7 We 
have relied in particular on the Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and Contiguous Zone, adopted on April 29, 1958, 15 
U. S. T. 1607, T. I. A. S. 5639. 8 The Convention provides 
that the sovereignty of a state extends to "internal waters." 
Article 1. The Convention also contains a set of rules delim-
iting those waters. Generally speaking, Article 3 defines 
6 The Special Master rested his conclusion that Massachusetts had to 
prove its claim "clear beyond doubt" on two cases of this Court and three 
reports of Special Masters in other original jurisdiction cases. See Louisi-
ana Boundary Case, 394 U. S. 11, 77 (1969); United States v. California, 
381 U. S. 139, 175 (1965); Report of the Special Master, 0. T. 1984, No. 35 
Orig., p. 11; Report of the Special Master, 0. T. 1974, No. 9 Orig., 
pp. 18-19; Report of the Special Master, 0. T. 1973, No. 52 Orig., p. 42. 
Cf. Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case, -- U.S. --,· 
- -- (1985) (slip op. 18-19). 
Although the Master's conclusion regarding the burden of proof was the 
focus of the Commonwealth's opening brief, we find it unnecessary to ad-
dress the issue given our disposition of the case. Whatever the measure of 
proof, Massachusetts concedes that it bears the risk of nonpersuasion. 
See Brief for Defendant 7. 
7 See United States v. California, 381 U. S., at 161-167. See also Ala-
bama and Mississippi Boundary Case,-- U. S., at-- (slip op. 4:_5); 
United States v. Maine (Rhode Island and New York Boundary Case), 
-U.S.-,- (1985) (slip op. 8-9); United States v. Alaska, 422 
U. S. 184, 188-189 (1975); Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U. S., at 35. 
8 See Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U. S., at 21 (Convention contains 
"'the best and most workable definitions available'" (quoting United States 
v. California, 381 U. S., at 165)) . 
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"internal waters" as those waters landward of a baseline 
which Article 5(1) in turn defines as "the low-water line along 
the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized 
by the coastal states." Of importance to this case, the Con-
vention also includes as a state's "internal waters" those wa-
ters enclosed in "bays" as defined in Article 7. Most of the 
rules in this Article identify the criteria for defining "juridi-
cal" bays, but Article 7(6) further includes as "bays" "so-
called 'historic' bays" and waters landward of baselines 
marked when "the straight baseline system provided for in 
article 4 is applied." 
In this case, Massachusetts relies exclusively on the provi-
sion recognizing "historic bays," for it is agreed both that the 
United States has legitimately eschewed the straight base-
line method for determining its boundaries, 9 and that Nan-
tucket Sound does not qualify as a juridical bay. Because 
"historic bay" is not defined in the Convention, we have pre-
viously relied on a United Nations study authored by the 
U. N. Secretariat and entitled Juridical Regime of Historic 
Waters, Including Historical Bays, [1962] 2 Y. B. Int'l L. 
Comm'n 1, U. N. Doc. AJCN.4/143 (1962) (hereinafter "Ju-
ridical Regime"). See Alabama and Mississippi Boundary 
Case,- U. S. -,-(1985) (slip op. 8-9). That study 
prescribes the three factors of dominion, continuity, and in-
ternational acquiescence recognized in our own cases for 
identifying a "historic bay." 10 The Commonwealth submits 
9 We have previously held that the decision to use the straight baseline 
system provided for in Article 4 of the Convention rests with the Federal 
Government. See Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case,- U. S., 
at- (slip op. 6); Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U. S., at 72-73; United 
States v. California, 381 U. S., at 167-168. 
10 "The term 'historic bay' is not defined in the Convention and there is no 
complete accord as to its meaning. The Court has stated that a historic 
bay is a bay 'over which the coastal nation has traditionally asserted and 
maintained dominion with the acquiescence of foreign nations.' United 
States v. California, 381 U. S., at 172. See also United States v. Alaska, 
422 U.S., at 189; Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U.S., at 23. The Court 
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that the three part test is actually the standard for finding 
"historic title" and that a different doctrine-the doctrine of 
"ancient title"-is also a sufficient basis for identifying a "his-
toric bay" under Article 7(6) of the Convention. According 
to Massachusetts, "historic title" is the maritime counterpart 
of title acquired by adverse possession. It is prescriptive in 
character because it arises as a result of a state's exercise of 
dominion over water that would otherwise constitute either 
high seas or territorial sea in which all ships enjoy the right 
of innocent passage. Before this Court, Massachusetts no 
longer claims "historic title" as it uses the term. Brief for 
Defendant 4; Reply Brief for Defendant 22. 
The Commonwealth instead relies entirely on a claim of 
"ancient title." This is the first case in which we have been 
asked to evaluate such a claim to coastal waters. According 
to the Juridical Regime, an "ancient title" is based on a 
state's discovery and occupation of territory unclaimed by 
any other sovereign when it was first acquired. To claim 
"ancient title" to waters that would otherwise constitute high 
seas or territorial sea, a state must 
"affir[m] that the occupation took place before the free-
dom of the high seas became part of international law. 
In that case, the State would claim acquisition of the 
area by an occupation which took place long ago. 
also has noted that there appears to be general agreement that at least 
three factors are to be taken into consideration in determining whether a 
body of water is a historic bay: (1) the exercise of authority over the area 
by the claiming nation; (2) that continuity of this exercise of authority; and 
(3) the acquiescence of foreign nations. See United States v. Alaska, 422 
U. S., at 189; Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U. S., at 75 and 23-24, n. 27. 
An authoritative United Nations study concludes that these three factors 
require that 'the coastal State must have effectively exercised sovereignty 
over the area continuously during a time sufficient to create a usage and 
have done so under the general toleration of the community of States.' J u-
ridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays 56, U. N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/143 (1962)." Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case, -
U. S., at--- (footnotes omitted) (slip op. 8-9). 
'. 
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Strictly speaking, the State would, however, not assert a 
historic title, but an ancient title based on occupation as 
an original mode of acquisition of territory. The differ-
ence is subtle but should in the interest of clarity be not 
overlooked: to base the title on occupation is to base it on 
a clear original title which is fortified by long usage." 
Juridical Regime, supra, at 12 (~ 71) (emphasis added). 
Assuming, arguendo, that waters that would otherwise be 
considered high seas or territorial sea may be claimed under 
a theory of "ancient title," both parties agree that effective 
"occupation" must have taken place before the freedom of the 
high seas became a part of international law. Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 16-17, 34; Brief for Defendant 4. By this analysis, the 
title must have been perfected no later than the latter half of 
the 18th century. 11 
11 One cannot, as a historical matter, point to a precise date on which the 
international community would have rejected an assertion of sovereignty 
over Nantucket Sound as contrary to international law. It is clear, how-
ever, that such a claim would have become progressively less tenable 
throughout the eighteenth century: 
"The seventeenth century marked the heyday of the mare clausum (closed 
sea) with claims by England, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Genoa, Tuscany, 
the Papacy, Turkey, and Venice. 
"In the eighteenth century the position changed completely. Dutch pol-
icies had favoured freedom of navigation and fishing in the previous cen-
tury, and the great publicist Grotius had written against the Portuguese 
monopoly of navigation and commerce in the East Indies. After the acces-
sion of William of Orange to the English throne in 1689 English disputes 
with Holland over fisheries ceased. However, sovereignty of the sea was 
still asserted against France, and in general the formal requirement of the 
salute to the flag was maintained. By the late eighteenth century the 
claim to sovereignty was obsolete and the requirement of the flag cere-
mony was ended in 1805. After 1691 extensive Danish claims were re-
duced by stages to narrow fixed limits. By the late eighteenth century the 
cannon-shot rule predominated, and claims to large areas of sea faded 
away." L. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 233-234 (2d 
ed. 1973) (footnotes omitted). 
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III 
Although the Special Master discussed "the history of 
[Nantucket Sound], especially [its] role in the development of 
the colonial economy of Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket Is-
land," Report 27, his discussion leaves us in doubt whether 
he felt that "the colonists' exploitation of the marine re-
sources of the soun[d] was equivalent to a formal assumption 
of sovereignty over" it before freedom of the seas became 
generally recognized. I d., at 58. 12 Because the Common-
wealth relied on the same historical evidence to establish 
both "historic" and "ancient" title, and because "the ultimate 
responsibility for deciding what are correct findings of fact 
remains with us" in any event, 13 we have examined for our-
selves the pertinent exhibits and transcripts. Our independ-
ent review leads us to conclude that the Commonwealth did 
not effectively "occupy" Nantucket Sound so as to obtain 
"clear original title" and fortify that title "by long usage" be-
fore the seas were recognized to be free. 
"[I]t is an undeniable fact that, since the days of Grotius, the principle of 
the freedom of the high seas found an ever wider currency and that, after a 
gradual evolution, it gained the upper hand towards the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, when it crystallized into a universally accepted princi-
ple of international law." Y. Blum, Historic Titles in International Law 
§ 61, pp. 242-243 (1965). 
We find it unnecessary to select a "critical date" upon which the commu-
nity of states would have rejected a British claim to Nantucket Sound. 
Because the colonists' activities changed gradually in character and inten-
sity over time, we need say only that effective "occupation" must have rip-
ened into "clear original title," "fortified by long usage," no later than the 
latter half of the 1700s. 
12 The Special Master discussed this history only as regards "historic" 
title, see Report 27, even though he recognized that "[e]ffective occupa-
tion, from a time prior to the victory of the doctrine of freedom of the seas" 
is necessary "to establish a valid claim to a body of water under ancient 
title," id., at 25-26. 
18 Colorado v. New Mexico, - . -U.S. --, -- (1984) (slip op. 6). 
See Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case,-- U. S., at-- (slip op. 
8) and cases cited therein. 
·' 
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Massachusetts relies on the colonists' "intensive and exclu-
sive exploitation" of the marine resources of Nantucket 
Sound to establish occupation. Reply Brief for Defendant 
17. At the outset, we have some difficulty appraising the 
Commonwealth's historical evidence because the cases and 
publications cited to us uniformly discuss occupation in the 
context of "historic" rather than "ancient" title. Assuming 
that the parties are correct in their unspoken assumption 
that occupation sufficient to establish "historic title" resem-
bles that necessary to acquire "ancient title" as well, and fur-
ther assuming that such title extends to the whole of the wa-
ters of the Sound and is not merely a right to exploit its 
resources, we believe that occupation requires, at a mini-
mum, the existence of acts, attributable to the sovereign, 
manifesting an assertion of exclusive authority over the wa-
ters claimed. 14 The history of the two most publicized cases 
conveys the international understanding of occupation. 
In the Fisheries Case (U. K. v. Nor.), 1951 I. C. J. 116, 
the Permanent International Court of Justice upheld Nor-
way's use of straight baselines (now approved expressly by 
Article 7(6) of the Convention), in part because Norway had 
proved a historic claim to the "comparatively shallow'' waters 
between the mainland and the fringing islands known as the 
Skjaergaard, or "rock rampart." The Court acknowledged 
1
' The Juridical Regime quotes two definitions of "occupation": 
"[Occupation] is defined by Oppenheim as follows: 
'Occupation is the act of appropriation by a State by which it intentionally 
acquires sovereignty over such territory as is at. the time not under the 
sovereignty of another State.' 
A similar definition is given by Fauchille: 
'Generally speaking, occupation is the taking by a State, with the intention 
of acting as the owner, of something which does not belong to any other 
State but which is susceptible of sovereignty.'" Juridical Regime, supra, 
at 12 (~ 70). 
On the possible difference between occupation as a mode of original acqui-
sition of territory as contrasted to occupation eventuating in prescriptive 
acquisition, see M. Strohl, The International Law of Bays 328, n. 27 (1963). 
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that Norwegian fishermen had exploited-fishing grounds in 
this region "from time immemorial," id., at 127, and that the 
King of Denmark and Norway had excluded fishermen from 
other States "for a long period, from 1616-1618 until 1906." 
Id., at 124; see id., at 142. 
Of similar effect is the case of Annakumary Pillai v. 
Muthupayal, 27 Indian L. Rep. 551 (Mad. Ser. 1903). The 
complainant in that case was a lessee of the Rajah of Ramnad 
who accused the defendant of stealing chanks (mollusks) from 
the seabed five miles off the Ramnad coast. The Indian 
High Court upheld its own jurisdiction and the liability of the 
defendant "upon the immemorial claim of the land sovereign 
over this body of water." P. Jessup, The Law of Territorial 
Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction 16 (1927) (footnote omit-
ted). The Officiating Chief Judge, relying on historical evi-
dence dating from the 6th century B. C. and explaining the 
concessions under which chanks and pearls were historically 
gathered by the state's licensees, declared that "it would be 
impossible to ignore the fact that for ages in this country, 
chanks and pearl oysters have been owned and enjoyed by 
the sovereign as belonging by prerogative right exclusively 
to him." 27 Indian L. Rep., at 557. "And [because] chanks 
as well as pearl oysters while still in the beds have always 
been taken to be the exclusive property of the sovereign, . . . 
the fishery operations connected therewith have always been 
carried on under State control and have formed a source of 
revenue to the exchequer." Id., at 554. The Officiating 
Chief Judge concluded that this history demonstrated "exclu-
sive occupation" of "the fisheries in question." I d., at 566. 15 
16 Because of a division of opinion between the Officiating Chief Judge 
and the second judge on the two-judge panel, the case was subsequently 
heard by a three-judge panel. The later panel unanimously agreed with 
the judgment of the Officiating Chief Judge and with his historical analysis. 
See Annakumary Pillai v. Muthupayal, 27 Indian L. Rep. 551, 572 (Mad. 
Ser. 1903). 
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We have encountered additional examples of claims to title 
based on exploitation of marine resources-the pearl fisher-
ies in Australia, Mexico, and Columbia, the oyster beds in the 
Bay of Granville and off the Irish Coast, the coral beds off the 
coasts of Algeria, Sardinia, and Sicily, and various grounds in 
which herring, among other fishes, are found. See T. Ful-
ton, The Sovereignty of the Sea 696-698 (1911). The con-
tinuation of apparently longstanding state regulation over 
these fisheries does not contradict, and is indeed perfectly 
consistent with, the understanding of occupation reflected in 
the Norwegian and Indian cases just discussed. 
In contrast, the historical evidence introduced by Massa-
chusetts does not show effective occupation of Nantucket 
Sound. To be sure, the Commonwealth's expert witness on 
the history of the Sound, Dr. Louis De Vorsey, a historical 
geographer, did conclude that Nantucket Sound was part of 
an "amphibious resource region" due to the "intimate rela-
tionship" between the inhabitants of the area and the sur-
rounding waters. 16 By this Dr. De Vorsey meant essentially 
that the residents took their livelihood from the sea. Al-
though fascinating from a historical geographer's point of in-
terest, the testimony of Dr. De Vorsey and the exhibits intro-
duced through him do not satisfy the legal threshold for 
occupation of a coastal water body. 
To begin with, . the opinion that Nantucket Sound formed 
part of an "amphibious resource region" does not prove occu-
pation of the . entirety of Nantucket Sound. That conclusion 
was based largely on activity which undoubtedly took place 
16 Dr. De Vorsey inferred this intimate relationship in part from 17th and · 
18th century maps naming prominent features and attempting to chart the 
depths of Nantucket Sound. As Dr. DeVorsey acknowledged, however, 
none of these maps identified Nantucket Sound as a separate body of water 
even though they did identify other bodies of water such as Cape Cod Bay, 
Buzzard's Bay, and, in two instances, Vineyard Sound. These early maps 
do not support Massachusetts' contention that the area's inhabitants estab-
lished a special relationship with the protected waters of Nantucket Sound 
as opposed to the surrounding waters and ocean in general. 
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either within territorial waters or on dry land. For exam-
ple, to evidence the colonists' close relationship with the sea, 
Dr. DeVorsey pointed to the use of sand for glassmaking, 
stone polishing, and farming. Other activities, such as the 
building of mills powered by the tide, the making of salt from 
sea water, and the gathering of seaweed for fertilizer and in-
sulation, also fail to establish occupation of Nantucket Sound. 
Even considering this evidence together with the more 
water-based pursuits of harvesting oysters and clams and 
hunting whales, we do not find sufficient evidence of occupa-
tion of Nantucket Sound as a whole. Massachusetts con-
cedes that oysters were dug mainly in the harbors, and for 
decades the colonists' exploitation of whales was restricted to 
those that had drifted onto the beach. Although the resi-
dents by the mid-18th century had developed a technique for 
driving whales onto beaches by pursuing them in modified 
four to five man Indian canoes, and they certainly caught 
shellfish and clams outside the shallow water near shore, 
there is no satisfactory evidence that these activities oc-
curred over the entirety of Nantucket Sound, and in particu-
lar over the portion of the Sound which the United States 
contends is high seas. 
The evidence of occupation adduced by Massachusetts is 
also deficient because it does not warrant a finding that the 
colonists asserted an exclusive right to the waters of Nan-
tucket Sound. he e ·dence occu~ion ~uc · by 
assa~se is a~ defic1 t beca it do not arra a 
ing t t the o~o~ sse d an clusiv rign o t 
wat of N a uck So una The closest the Commonwea th 
comes is a 1672 con rae by which the Town of Nantucket at-
tempted to engage a whaler by the name of Lopar to "follow 
the trade of whaling on the island" for two years ~ exchange 
for, inter alia, an exclusive license to hunt whales and ten 
acres of land. There is no evidence that the contract was 
carried out (and in particular no record of a conveyance of 
real property), and no suggestion in the contract that the li-
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cense was limited, or even especially concerned with, whaling 
in Nantucket Sound. Indeed, the contract does not clearly 
reflect an exclusive proprietary interest in whales anywhere: 
it may simply represent a covenant on the part of the Nan-
tucket islanders not to compete with the whaling company or 
companies chartered under the proposed contract. The only 
other evidence of an assertion of exclusive control was a 1692 
Colonial Resolve to build a vessel to protect coastal ships in 
Vineyard Sound against the depredations of New Yorkers, 
with whom a dispute was brewing at the time. 17 But this ev-
idence concerning Vineyard Sound merely highlights the lack 
of any comparable evidence concerning Nantucket Sound. 
In the absence of evidence limiting use of Nantucket Sound to 
the inhabitants of its shores, there is no reason to exempt 
these waters from such rights as innocent passage tradition-
ally enjoyed in common by all members of the international 
polity. 
Even if Massachusetts had introduced evidence of inten-
sive and exclusive exploitation of the entirety of Nantucket 
Sound, we would still be troubled by the lack of any linkage 
between these activities and the English Crown. Cf. United 
States v. Alaska, 422 U. S. 184, 190-191, 203 (1975). Unless 
we are to believe that the self-interested endeavors of every 
sea-faring community suffices to establish "ancient title" to 
the waters containing the fisheries and resources it exploits, 
without regard to continuity of usage or international ac-
quiescence necessary to establish "historic title," solely be-
cause exploitation predated the freedom of the seas, then the 
Commonwealth's claim cannot be 'recognized. Accordingly, 
we find that the colonists of Nantucket Sound did not effec-
tively occupy that body of water; as a consequence, Great 
17 The dispute was resolved peacefully, there is no evidence that the ves-
sel was built, and the only other patrol vessel of which Dr. De Vorsey testi-
fied was engaged in convoying merchantmen, not in protecting Nantucket 
Sound. 
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Britain did not obtain title which could devolve upon 
Massachusetts. 
IV 
Our determination that Massachusetts had not established 
clear title prior to freedom of the seas is corroborated by the 
Commonwealth's consistent failure to assert dominion over 
Nantucket Sound since that time. 18 Three examples should 
suffice to demonstrate that during the 18th and 19th centu-
ries Massachusetts continued to treat Nantucket Sound in a 
manner inconsistent with its recent characterization of that 
body as internal waters. · 
First, in 1847, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts issued an opinion which is generally understood as hav-
ing adopted Lord Coke's more demanding version of the line-
of-sight test for determining whether jaws of land enclosed 
inland waters. 19 Since it is agreed that Nantucket Sound 
18 See Temple of Preah Vihear, 1962 I. C. J. 6, 61 (separate opinion of 
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice) ("It is a general principle of law ... that a party's 
attitude, state of mind or intentions at a later date can be regarded as good 
evidence-in relation to the same or closely connected matter-<>f his atti-
tude, state of mind or intentions at an earlier date also; ... the existence of 
a state of fact, or of a situation, at a later date may furnish good presump-
tive evidence of its existence at an earlier date also, even where the later 
situation or state of affairs has in other respects to be excluded from con-
sideration." (citations omitted)). 
While the position of Massachusetts is discussed in text, it bears mention 
that the United States did not assert sovereignty over Nantucket Sound 
either. In 1789 the First Congress established a customs enforcement 
system, which included a number of separate districts in Massachusetts. 
The statutory definition of the District of Nantucket included "the Island of 
Nantucket" without any reference to adjacent waters, whereas the District 
of Edgartown, which included Martha's Vineyard and the Elizabeth Is-
lands, expressly incorporated "all the waters and shores" within Duke 
County. Act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. 29, 31. This distinction was re-
peated in subsequent legislation in 1790, Act of Aug. 4, 1790, 1 Stat. 145, 
146, and in 1799, Act of Mar. 2, 1799, 1 Stat. 627, 629. 
19 In Commonwealth v. Peters, 53 Mass. 387, 392 (1847), the Massachu-
setts high court held: 
~ ··:· 
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could not qualify as inland waters under ·the Coke test, the 
Court's decision that that test was part of the common law of 
Massachusetts supports the further conclusion that the 
Sound was not part of the internal waters of the 
Commonwealth. 
This conclusion was confirmed in 1859 when the Massachu-
setts legislature enacted a statute defining the seaward 
boundary of the Commonwealth at one marine league (or 
three nautical miles) from the coast. See Acts of 1859, 
Chapter 289, Mass. Ex. 53. In accordance with this meas-
ure, the statute treated arms of the sea as part of the Com-
monwealth if the distance between their headlands did not 
exceed two marine leagues. Thus, the statute replaced the 
ambiguous line-of-sight test for applying the inter fauces ter-
rae doctrine with a fixed standard of six nautical miles. 
Since the distance between Monomoy Point and Nantucket 
Island is admittedly more than six nautical miles, Massachu-
sett's statutory definition of its own coastline excluded Nan-
tucket Sound. 
"All creeks, havens, coves, and inlets lying within projecting headlands 
and islands, and all bays and arms of the sea lying within and between 
lands not so wide but that persons and objects on the one side can be dis-
cerned by the naked eye by persons on the opposite side, are taken to be 
within the body of the county." 
Chief Judge Shaw's adoption of the Coke test in Peters is consistent with 
Judge Story's earlier exposition in United States v. Crush, 26 Fed. Cas. 48, 
52 (C. C. D. Mass. 1829): 
"I do not understand by this expression that it is necessary that the shores 
should be so near, that all that is done on one shore could be discerned, and 
testified to with certainty, by persons standing on the opposite shore; but 
that objects on the opposite shore might be reasonably discerned, that is 
might be distinctly seen with the naked eye and clearly distinguished from 
each other." 
The parties do not disagree with the Master's conclusion that the American 
view of the proper test, which followed Coke, differed from the British 
view, which followed Hale. 
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Finally, in 1881, the Massachusetts legislature enacted a 
statute directing its Harbor and Land Commission to prepare 
charts identifying the boundaries that had been established 
by the 1859 law. Official charts prepared pursuant to that 
legislation are consistent with the Master's conclusion that 
Vineyard Sound was considered part of the Commonwealth, 
but that Nantucket Sound was not. 
It was not until 1971 that Massachusetts first asserted its 
claim to jurisdiction over Nantucket Sound. There is simply 
no evidence that the English Crown or its colonists had ob-
tained "clear original title" to the Sound in the 17th century, 
or that such title was "fortified by long usage." Without 
such evidence, we are surely not prepared to enlarge the ex-
ception in Article 7(6) of the Convention for historic bays to 
embrace a claim of "ancient title" like that advanced in this 
case. 20 
The parties are directed to prepare and submit a decree 
conforming to the recommendations of the Special Master. 
It is so ordered. 
00 The validity of and any limits to the "ancient title" theory are accord-
ingly reserved for an appropriate case. In view of our decision that the 
history of Nantucket Sound does not support the acquisition of "ancient 
title" by Massachusetts, we similarly decline to address the question 
whether the Commonwealth abandoned or renounced that title, and the an-
tecedent issue of under what standard that judgment should be made. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.tu.prttttt <!fourt of tqt ~ittb .ttab.e' 
'Jht.&'fthtgton. ~. Of. 2.0biJl.~ 
January 22, 1986 
No. 35 Orig. United States v. Maine 
Dear John, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
. .iuprtmt <!fouri .ttl tltt ~tb ,ita.Us 
._uftinghnt. ~. QJ. 2ll~'l>~ 
January 23, 1986 
Re: 35 Original - United States v. Maine 
Dear John: 




cc: The Conference 
CHAMI!t£RS 01'" 
.JUSTICE WM . .J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
January 23, 1986 
No. 35 Original 
-
Maine v. United States, et al. 
Dear John, 




Copies to the Conference 
.t 
Jnnuary 23, 1986 
35 Orig. United States v. Maine 
Dear John: 




cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~uuu <trourl d ut~ ~b .itatte 
.uJri:n¢on. ~. ar. 21T,?J!' 
Re: 35 Original - United States v. Maine 
Dear John: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
.. ~ 
January 24, 1986 
CHAMB E R S OF' 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
~ttprtmt Of&tnrl Gf tltt ~tb ~tatt.e' 
Jlag~n. ~. Of. 211~~~ 
January 27, 1986 
No. 35, Orig. - United States v. Maine 
Dear John, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAM!IE:RS 0,. 
THE CHIEF" JUSTICE 
~u.ptnnt Qfouri of tift ~b ~tatt· 
'~lbtslfinghtn. ~. <!J. 2D.;t,., 
January 28, 1986 





Copies to the Conference 
35 Orig. United States v. Maine (Cabell} 
JPS for the Court 12/13/85 
1st draft 1/22/86 
2nd draft 1/28/86 
3rd draft 2/6/86 
Joined by soc 1/22;86 
WJB 1/23/86 
WHR 1/23/86 
LFP l/23/86 
HAB l/24/86 
BRW 1/27/86 
CJ 1/29/86 
\ . 
. · 
